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Cornell University

Explaining Legal Agreement and Disagreement

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Why do lawyers and judges agree on what the law directs in particular cases as often as they do? Why do they sometimes disagree? And what can this agreement and disagreement teach us about the nature of law—about the sort of thing that law is, wherever and whenever it is found? This dissertation develops a version of Hartian Positivism and shows how it straightforwardly explains legal practitioners’ agreement, as well as their disagreement, with respect to the law. Indeed, Hartian Positivism better accounts for these facts than rival theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity, Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory, and Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Watson, Frederick
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Marmor, Andres
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Markovits, Julia
  • Atiq, Emad

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
16176400
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13467
ProQuest Publication ID: 30247966

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Watson, Frederick. Explaining Legal Agreement and Disagreement. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114173