Abstract
dc:description.abstractWhy do lawyers and judges agree on what the law directs in particular cases as often as they do? Why do they sometimes disagree? And what can this agreement and disagreement teach us about the nature of law—about the sort of thing that law is, wherever and whenever it is found? This dissertation develops a version of Hartian Positivism and shows how it straightforwardly explains legal practitioners’ agreement, as well as their disagreement, with respect to the law. Indeed, Hartian Positivism better accounts for these facts than rival theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity, Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory, and Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Philosophy
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Watson, Frederick
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Marmor, Andres
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Markovits, Julia
- Atiq, Emad
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 16176400
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 13467
ProQuest Publication ID: 30247966