Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis study examines whether and how antitrust risk affects firms’ disclosure of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Due to regulatory exemptions, deals that fall below a size threshold escape formal antitrust scrutiny at the time of the merger. These “non-reported” deals can have important implications for the firm’s pricing power of its products in segmented and localized markets. I hypothesize that firms face a trade-off between the benefits of disclosing these deals to capital markets (i.e., capitalize the product market benefits into stock prices in a timely manner) and the potential antitrust scrutiny the voluntary disclosure can invite, which increases the probability of agencies challenging the merger. Exploiting two quasi-exogenous variations in antitrust enforcement that affect the level of antitrust risk, I find evidence of acquirers strategically managing their disclosure of horizontal and intrastate deals according to the level of antitrust risk. My findings shed light on a new determinant of voluntary disclosure: the risk of costly antitrust enforcement.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Management
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Management
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Oh, Jun
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Yeung, Ping
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Zuo, Luo
- Bloomfield, Robert
- Campello, Murillo
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 16219299
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 13688
ProQuest Publication ID: 30491425