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Cornell University

THE ETHICS OF GENDERED NAMING, THE MORAL DANGER OF LOVE AVOWALS, AND THE MORAL VALUE OF INSULTS

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I pragmatically and morally analyze three categories of ubiquitous speech: gendered naming, love avowals, and insults. In Chapter 1, I argue that our naming practices are out of step with widely held social values about gender equality. I identify what I call the BioSex Logic of Naming, according to which strong social norms prescribe that first names track presumed biological sex. I argue gender-specific names and gender-specific pronouns are natural bedfellows, both of which play a crucial, companionate role in reinforcing gender essentialism and maintaining gender hierarchy. I conclude that we have strong pro tanto reasons to jettison both gender-specific pronouns and gender-specific names while also protecting binary trans* people who are at beholden to the current system for gendered uptake. In Chapter 2, I argue love avowals have a morally dark side. At their best, love avowals, such as, “I love you” are welcome expressions of affection and devotion. Love’s positive public image makes love avowals an appealing tool of manipulation. But, like the Trojan Horse, its surface appearance conceals ugly realities. This simplistic veneer diverts our attention away from the normative profundity of love avowals, which often function pragmatically as solicitations, illegitimate demands, excuses, exonerations, and the like. Love avowals conceal tacit bids for commitments that one may not entertain if they were communicated explicitly. I illuminate the pragmatic function of love avowals and argue we ought to be more critical of them, as they play a key role in consequential social scripts, some of which facilitate abuse. In Chapter 3, I argue, contrary to dominant thought, insults are not inherently morally wrong. Insults can have a unique organizing role in social justice movements and reimagining social hierarchies of race and gender. Extant theories generalize the nature of insults from a narrow subset of insults and conceive of them as invariably problematic. This theoretical commitment to the immorality of insults precludes the possibility of developing an ethics of insults. I develop a morally neutral theory of insults that identifies an overlooked variety, third-personal insults, and allows a distinction between permissible and impermissible insults.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Takaoka, Adriene
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Manne, Kate
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Starr, William
  • Murray, Sarah
  • Markovits, Julia

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
16219384
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 13795
ProQuest Publication ID: 30571233

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Takaoka, Adriene. THE ETHICS OF GENDERED NAMING, THE MORAL DANGER OF LOVE AVOWALS, AND THE MORAL VALUE OF INSULTS. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/114776