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Cornell University

Designing Secure-By-Default Cryptography for Computer Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Designing cryptography that protects against all the threats seen in deployment can be surprisingly hard to do. This frequently translates into mitigations which offload important security decisions onto practitioners or even end users. The end result is subtle vulnerabilities in our most important cryptographic protocols. This dissertation examines two major areas on designing cryptography for real-world applications that targets security by default: (1) symmetric encryption and (2) key transparency for end-to-end encrypted systems. This work approaches these areas by understanding real-world threats to provide robust, principled defenses with strong assurance against these threats in practice. This dissertation includes introducing a new class of attacks exploiting symmetric encryption in applications, developing new theory to act as guidance in building better schemes, and designing practical cryptographic protocols. This work has seen impact through updates in popular encryption tools and IETF draft standards and through the development of protocols under consideration for deployment.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Computer Science
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Len, Julia
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Ristenpart, Thomas
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Dell, Nicola
  • Juels, Ari

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
16611743
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 14580
ProQuest Publication ID: 31488643

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Len, Julia. Designing Secure-By-Default Cryptography for Computer Systems. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/116504