Abstract
dc:description.abstractWhen applying for a job, a worker faces two possible options: to tell the truth or to lie. Most models treat lying ability as innate; however, like all abilities, the ability to lie can be developed over time. If a worker has finite time to allocate between developing skills and lies, how will they choose to split their time, and how will this affect a firm's decision to hire? This paper develops an education signaling model with the two-dimensional ability for an applicant to develop skills and lies. The different distributions of costs to develop these abilities will provide insight into how firms react to uncertainty.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- M.A., Economics
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Master of Arts
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Economics
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bearman, Reuben
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Blume, Lawrence
- Committee member dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Lamba, Rohit
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 17423281
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 12597
ProQuest Publication ID: 32241725