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Cornell University

Signaling Games with Lying Costs

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

When applying for a job, a worker faces two possible options: to tell the truth or to lie. Most models treat lying ability as innate; however, like all abilities, the ability to lie can be developed over time. If a worker has finite time to allocate between developing skills and lies, how will they choose to split their time, and how will this affect a firm's decision to hire? This paper develops an education signaling model with the two-dimensional ability for an applicant to develop skills and lies. The different distributions of costs to develop these abilities will provide insight into how firms react to uncertainty.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
M.A., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Master of Arts
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bearman, Reuben
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Blume, Lawrence
Committee member dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Lamba, Rohit

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
17423281
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 12597
ProQuest Publication ID: 32241725

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Bearman, Reuben. Signaling Games with Lying Costs. Master of Arts thesis, Cornell University, 2025. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/121009