Cornell University
Sanctionable Behavior and Selective Enforcement: Explaining Forbearance from and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions
Abstract
dc:description.abstractEconomic sanctions are among the most frequently deployed instruments of statecraft, yet fundamental questions about their politics and effects remain unresolved. This dissertation argues that progress requires solving a prior methodological problem: existing research studies only sanctioned states, obscuring both why some violations are punished and others are not, and whether sanctions actually change target behavior. I address these challenges by introducing the Sanctionable Behavior Dataset (SBD), which tracks behaviors that recurrently trigger sanctions and records, for each state-year between 1989 and 2015, whether a given state engaged in that behavior and whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations, United States, or European Union. I deploy this framework to advance two substantive theories. First, I show that states heavily import-reliant on a dominant partner systematically escape its sanctions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, economic vulnerability reduces likelihood of coercion because hierarchical lock-in makes enforcement costly. Second, I advance research on credible commitment, showing that sanctions compel behavioral change only when a sender has both reputation for resolve and enforcement history specific to the targeted behavior. Together, these findings reframe the politics of sanctions enforcement and provide answers to long-standing puzzles in the literature on initiation and effectiveness of sanctions.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Government
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Government
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Vladicic, Aleksandar
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Way, Christopher
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Ba, Oumar
- Katzenstein, Peter
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Attribution 4.0 International
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Other
-
Vladicic_cornellgrad_0058F_15554
https://www.proquest.com/LegacyDocView/DISSNUM/32675360