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Cornell University

Sanctionable Behavior and Selective Enforcement: Explaining Forbearance from and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Economic sanctions are among the most frequently deployed instruments of statecraft, yet fundamental questions about their politics and effects remain unresolved. This dissertation argues that progress requires solving a prior methodological problem: existing research studies only sanctioned states, obscuring both why some violations are punished and others are not, and whether sanctions actually change target behavior. I address these challenges by introducing the Sanctionable Behavior Dataset (SBD), which tracks behaviors that recurrently trigger sanctions and records, for each state-year between 1989 and 2015, whether a given state engaged in that behavior and whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations, United States, or European Union. I deploy this framework to advance two substantive theories. First, I show that states heavily import-reliant on a dominant partner systematically escape its sanctions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, economic vulnerability reduces likelihood of coercion because hierarchical lock-in makes enforcement costly. Second, I advance research on credible commitment, showing that sanctions compel behavioral change only when a sender has both reputation for resolve and enforcement history specific to the targeted behavior. Together, these findings reframe the politics of sanctions enforcement and provide answers to long-standing puzzles in the literature on initiation and effectiveness of sanctions.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Government
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Government
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Vladicic, Aleksandar
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Way, Christopher
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Ba, Oumar
  • Katzenstein, Peter

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
Vladicic_cornellgrad_0058F_15554
https://www.proquest.com/LegacyDocView/DISSNUM/32675360

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Vladicic, Aleksandar. Sanctionable Behavior and Selective Enforcement: Explaining Forbearance from and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2026. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/126643