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Cornell University

The Nature Of Predication

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for an occurrence of a term to function semantically as a predicate. The condition is that the term occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its denotation, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view on predication has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favor the ascription view. I then develop the ascription view and elicit a number of its virtues.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Liebesman, DavidF

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
6714469

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Liebesman, DavidF. The Nature Of Predication. 2009. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/14067