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Cornell University

Essays In Corporate Finance And Corporate Governance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Management
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • De Angelis, David
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Grinstein, Yaniv
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Michaely, Roni
  • Leary, Mark T
  • O'Hara, Maureen

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
7959718

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

De Angelis, David. Essays In Corporate Finance And Corporate Governance. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2012. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/31008