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Cornell University

Essays On Ceo Inside Debt

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as "inside debt". The reason is that their values depend on the ability of the firm to make future payments to its participant employees. Such plans have the potential of mitigating the risk-shifting problem of managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) because executives who own inside debt are worried about firm default risk and not only about shareholder return. In this dissertation, I examine the determinants of CEO inside debt and its components. I then use the inside debt as a measure of CEO risk preferences and examine its relation to firms' risk. In Chapter one, I use the new SEC disclosure rule of 2006 to examine the determinants of CEO inside debt. I find that CEOs defer a larger fraction of their compensation when their cash compensation is high, firm liquidity is high, firm default risk is low, and when executive personal wealth is high. These findings are consistent with CEOs choosing to defer compensation when they least need the money and when they do not expect the firm to default. In contrast to previous studies, I find a non-linear inverted U-shape relation between firm leverage and CEO inside debt. In particular, CEOs reduce their inside-debt when the firm is highly levered. Using novel data from executive deferred compensation, Chapter two presents new evidence on the relationship between CEO risk preference and firm risk (the volatility of firm performance measures such as stock return, earnings and operating cash flows). My results show a negative association between the CEO risk aversion (as measured by realized performance on inside debt) and the volatility of firm market performance: Firms with risk-averse CEOs have experience less stock price volatility. I also find that firms providing deferred compensation plans have lower performance volatility. The results contribute to the inside debt literature by showing that debt compensation is related to lower firm risk and lower firm market value. inside

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Agricultural Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Agricultural Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2011

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cen, Wei
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Ng, David T.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Grinstein, Yaniv
  • Leary, Mark T

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
8213954

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Cen, Wei. Essays On Ceo Inside Debt. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2011. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/33644