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Cornell University

Essays On Optimal Contract Design

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical levels, which cannot generate the convex wage structure unless further assumptions added on optimal effort levels and cost functions. The third chapter investigates the underlying assumption in Chapter 1 that people are inequity averse to ex-ante payoff differentials. Specifically, an online survey is conducted to test whether ex ante or ex post fairness views affect people's decision making in a social context. I find that the ex post fairness views do make an important role in people's decision making. The results of the survey data do not support the model of inequity aversion. c 2013 Jin Xu ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Xu, Jin
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Benjamin, Daniel
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Waldman, Michael
  • Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
  • O'Donoghue, Edward Donald

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
8267282

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Xu, Jin. Essays On Optimal Contract Design. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2013. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/34281