Abstract
dc:description.abstractWe introduce language-based games, in which utility is defined over descriptions in a given language. By choosing the right language, we can capture psychological games [9] and reference-dependent preference [15]. Of special interest are languages that can express only coarse beliefs (e.g., the probability of an event is "high" or "low", rather than "the probability is .628"): by assuming that a player's preferences depend only on what is true in a coarse language, we can resolve a number of well-known paradoxes in the literature, including the Allais paradox. Despite the expressive power of this approach, we show that it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions on the language.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Mathematics
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Mathematics
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bjorndahl, Adam
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Nerode, Anil
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Shore, Richard A
- Pass, Rafael N.
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 8793232