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Cornell University

Walter Burley On The Metaphysics Of The Proposition And Its Relation To Language And Thought

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation defends the claim that Walter Burley (died c. 1345) develops a sophisticated account of the proposition, where a proposition is an entity fulfilling various semantic and epistemic roles - first and foremost, to be the primary bearer of truth value. In doing so, it attempts to correct longstanding misconceptions about a key aspect of Burley's philosophy. In contrast to most approaches in the literature, which claim that Burley is principally concerned with the nature of states of affairs, this dissertation argues that he is concerned rather with the metaphysics of the proposition. Motivated by two deeper semantic commitments, Burley argues that a proposition is a complex entity composed of "things outside the soul" (res extra animam). The proposition that Barack Obama is a human, for example, is composed of Barack Obama and the property of humanity. Moreover, encouraged by the view that truth is fundamentally a matter of the mind's correspondence to the world, Burley argues that cognitive agents have the ability to arrange things together into propositions, where that arrangement is the exercise of a capacity to represent the world's being some way or other - for example, to represent that Barack Obama is a human. Consequently, on Burley's view, propositions are structured; they are complex, truth-conditional entities composed of things by mental acts. This dissertation situates that account of the proposition within Burley's wider account of thinking and demonstrative science. To that end, it argues that Burley develops a theory of mental language, according to which thinking is fundamentally a matter of mind's use of sentences composed of concepts, that is, of mental representations. Burley's commitment to mental language accomplishes a number of goals. Most significantly, it helps him integrate his account of the proposition into his account of demonstrative science, by resolving tensions brought on by the opacity of belief. Finally, this dissertation examines the evolution of Burley's account of the truth conditions of the proposition, arguing that the final account of those conditions involves the radical claim that things - the referents of categorematic expressions in natural and mental language - must have certain intrinsic semantic properties.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bulthuis, Nathaniel
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • MacDonald, Scott C.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Eklund, Matti
  • Pereboom, Derk

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
8793421

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Bulthuis, Nathaniel. Walter Burley On The Metaphysics Of The Proposition And Its Relation To Language And Thought. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2014. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/38891