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Cornell University

Essays In United States Social Security Policy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My dissertation examines the effects that US Social Security policy changes have on labor supply and application behavior. In my first chapter, I use survey data matched to administrative records to measure the effect of a natural experiment in the provision of information - the introduction of the Social Security Statement - on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) application behavior. I find that receipt of the Statement, a document gradually introduced in the 1990s which contained personalized information on all Social Security benefits, had a positive, substantial, and statistically significant effect on DI application, amounting to a 62% increase over the base rate. The overall effect was entirely driven by individuals reporting a work-limiting condition who were previously not employed. Furthermore, my analysis shows no evidence of applicants "shifting forward" their DI application. In the absence of these new applicants, the 32% growth rate of the per-capita DI rolls from 1995-2004 would have been approximately 25%, a 20% drop. My second chapter examines the impact of the Statement on individuals approaching retirement who are still working. I find that the effects are mixed: individuals working few hours per week prior to Statement receipt markedly increase their hours worked, while those working full time or more decrease their hours. However, it appears that individuals misunderstood that the Statement provided a retirement benefit projection based on constant earnings going forward. After second Statement receipt, those who previously decreased their labor supply then increased it. My third chapter uses program interactions between the two federal disability programs - DI and Supplemental Security Income - to estimate labor supply elasticities of DI beneficiaries. Given wide variation in SSI state supplements temporally and geographically and temporal variation in DI parameters, otherwise similar DI beneficiaries may face a 50% or 0% disability benefit reduction rate. This variation in marginal rate allows for a direct calculation of labor supply responsiveness to such a rate change. My elasticity estimates - the first for US disability beneficiaries based on differences in benefit reduction rates - are inelastic and low, ranging from -0.14 to -0.36 for the participation elasticity.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Economics
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2014

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Armour, Philip
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Burkhauser, Richard Valentine
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Lovenheim, Michael F
  • O'Donoghue, Edward Donald

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
8793435

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Armour, Philip. Essays In United States Social Security Policy. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2014. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/38903