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Cornell University

Bullets to Ballots: Maoists and the Lure of Democracy in India

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

How do insurgents give up arms and return to the same political processes that they had once sought to overthrow? A lot has been written on why men and women rebel, but we know very little about how rebels quit. This dissertation lays out the protracted process of retirement of Maoist rebels through informal exit networks that grow in the grey zones of insurgency-democracy interface in India. Based on fine-grained fieldwork in conflict zones in North and South India, I argue that the biggest fear of retiring rebels is that they could be killed as soon as they disarmed, potentially by their former enemies, by former comrades, or by various state agencies. The state policies for surrender and rehabilitation, however, focus on post retirement livelihood provisions without addressing this apprehension of rebels that hinders retirement. During intimate conversations with the author former rebels complained that while they could possibly lose their lives after disarming, the state would not lose much if retired rebels were killed. This creates a problem of credible commitment, which, I show, is resolved locally by the informal exit networks that flourish in the shadow of grassroots associations of civic participation. These exit networks are locally embedded. I argue that rebel retirement is exceptionally high in the South due to emergence of a harmonic exit network that weaves together multiple stakeholders in conflict zones in an amalgam of roles and alliances in a way that ensures returning rebels survive and reintegrate. In contrast, rebel retirement is low in the North due to emergence of a discordant exit network that exacerbates the fear and anxiety of retiring rebels and stifles their reintegration. I also show that emergence of a specific exit network is contingent on the social bases of insurgency, the strength of vertical and horizontal ties forged by the insurgent organization, and the everyday dynamics of democracy-insurgency interaction.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Government
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Government
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sen, Rumela
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Herring, Ronald J
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Mertha, Andrew
  • Pepinsky, Thomas

Subjects

dc:subject × 9

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
9906036
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 10145
ProQuest Publication ID: 10253731

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Sen, Rumela. Bullets to Ballots: Maoists and the Lure of Democracy in India. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2017. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/47789