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Cornell University

Retributive Caution, Guiltworthiness, and the Rationality of Anger

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

On a basic desert conception of moral responsibility, any agent who freely, knowingly, and inexcusably acts immorally deserves a negative response just because s/he so acted. The predominant view is that blame is the negative response at issue. I argue that, even if we know that an agent has freely, knowingly, and inexcusably acted immorally, there is no reliable evidence that this fact alone renders the agent deserving of blame or other form of censure. We ought, then, to be skeptical about the desert of blame, and in turn forego blaming or censuring on that basis. I argue that this does not entail that agents are never morally responsible for immoral acts. Some agents may still deserve to feel guilt for their immoral acts, and it is this guiltworthiness that explains their moral responsibility. Moreover, I argue that skepticism about the desert of blame does not impugn the rationality of our blaming emotions. These views stand in stark contrast to extant views concerning blame and moral responsibility, and offer solutions to heretofore unresolved issues in ethics.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Duggan, Austin Paul
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Pereboom, Derk
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Kosch, Michelle
  • Manne, Kate A.
  • Sturgeon, Nicholas Lee

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
10361595
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 10331
ProQuest Publication ID: 10289610

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Duggan, Austin Paul. Retributive Caution, Guiltworthiness, and the Rationality of Anger. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2017. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/56918