Abstract
dc:description.abstractAdvertising is a critical competition device that affects interactions among firms in the product market. I find that a nontrivial portion of public firms, even among those with intense advertising activities, do not disclose advertising expenses in their financial statements, indicating significant disclosure discretion. I further use product category-level data to construct measures that capture firm-level advertising rivalry. I predict and find that the likelihood of disclosing advertising expenses is negatively associated with advertising rivalry. This association is more pronounced when firms have less trackable media outlets, more volatile underlying advertising expenditures, and more mature products. These findings suggest that firms consider their advertising expenditures proprietary and that concerns of product market competition discourage their disclosure of advertising expenses despite the materiality constraint.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph. D., Management
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Management
- Grantor
- Cornell University
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Liang, Chuchu
- Chair dc:contributor.chair
-
- Yeung, Ping Eric
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Bloomfield, Robert J.
- Zuo, Luo
Subjects
dc:subject × 7Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Bibid
- 10489368
- Dc Identifier Other
-
ProQuest Submission ID: 10860
ProQuest Publication ID: 10817402