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Cornell University

Advertising Rivalry and Discretionary Disclosure

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Advertising is a critical competition device that affects interactions among firms in the product market. I find that a nontrivial portion of public firms, even among those with intense advertising activities, do not disclose advertising expenses in their financial statements, indicating significant disclosure discretion. I further use product category-level data to construct measures that capture firm-level advertising rivalry. I predict and find that the likelihood of disclosing advertising expenses is negatively associated with advertising rivalry. This association is more pronounced when firms have less trackable media outlets, more volatile underlying advertising expenditures, and more mature products. These findings suggest that firms consider their advertising expenditures proprietary and that concerns of product market competition discourage their disclosure of advertising expenses despite the materiality constraint.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Management
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Management
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Liang, Chuchu
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Yeung, Ping Eric
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Bloomfield, Robert J.
  • Zuo, Luo

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
10489368
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 10860
ProQuest Publication ID: 10817402

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Liang, Chuchu. Advertising Rivalry and Discretionary Disclosure. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59284