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Cornell University

Dilemmas of Opposition: Building Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Approximately one third of the world’s states are competitive authoritarian regimes, where opposition parties compete against powerful incumbents that skew political and electoral institutions to their advantage. A key challenge for opposition parties in such regimes is to expand their electoral support and work with other opposition actors to win greater power. Under what conditions are they successful in building broad-based and coordinated challenges to authoritarian rulers? This dissertation argues that opposition success hinges on their strategic choices in elections and in office – and how they navigate key tradeoffs and dilemmas of expansion. Individual opposition parties face diverging incentives and costs to expand based on the identities and issues around which they initially build support. At the collective level, opposition parties often seek to coordinate their electoral challenges against the incumbent to build broader power. But when opposition parties work together, they face strong pressure to stick with their existing niche identities, since pursuing strategies of party broadening – changes to party image to appeal to new constituencies – risks encroaching on the electoral terrain and core constituencies of their coalition partners. As a result, parties frequently struggle to navigate conflicting incentives of individual and collective electoral strategies to win power. The dissertation tests the theory empirically using evidence from Malaysia, until 2018 the world’s longest-running dominant party authoritarian government. It analyzes the strategies and variable success of the country’s opposition parties in pursuing their core electoral and policy goals and coordinating their efforts in this environment – and why they were ultimately successful in securing substantial electoral support. Additional case studies illustrate how individual and collective dilemmas of expansion inform opposition behavior in other competitive authoritarian regimes. The study offers new insights into why opposition parties have difficulty in unseating even weak authoritarian incumbents, and the conditions under which they successfully scale up their power.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Government
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Government
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Dettman, Sebastian
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Pepinsky, Thomas
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Roberts, Kenneth
  • van de Walle, Nicolas

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
10758063
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 11141
ProQuest Publication ID: 10937913

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Dettman, Sebastian. Dilemmas of Opposition: Building Parties and Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/64923