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Cornell University

Epistemic Gaps and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This dissertation defends materialism from the epistemic arguments against materialism. Materialism is the view that everything is ultimately physical. The epistemic arguments against materialism claim that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths (for example, that knowing the physical truths does not put you in a position to know the phenomenal truths), and conclude from this that there is a corresponding gap in the world between physical and phenomenal truths, and materialism is false. Chapter 1 introduces materialism and the arguments against materialism that I respond to in this dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), one promising materialist response to the epistemic arguments against materialism. The PCS admits that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, but claims that it arises because of something special about our concepts of consciousness and not because of something special about consciousness itself. Chapter 4 considers what reason there is to think that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in the first place. I argue that some arguments might succeed in showing that there is such an epistemic gap, but that if these arguments succeed then they end up vindicating the PCS. Chapter 5 considers more generally what is required for an epistemic gap to exist. In particular, it considers whether conceptual analysis is necessary to close an epistemic gap.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph.D., Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Foerster, Thomas
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Pereboom, Derk
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Silins, Nicholas
  • Starr, William B.

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
11050359
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 11403
ProQuest Publication ID: 13881566

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Foerster, Thomas. Epistemic Gaps and the Mind-Body Problem. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/67377