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Cornell University

Information design in service systems and online markets

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In mechanism design, the firm has an advantage over its customers in its knowledge of the state of the system, which can affect the utilities of all players. This poses the question: how can the firm utilize that information (and not additional financial incentives) to persuade customers to take actions that lead to higher revenue (or other firm utility)? When the firm is constrained to ``cheap talk,'' and cannot credibly commit to a manner of signaling, the firm cannot change customer behavior in a meaningful way. Instead, we allow firm to commit to how they will signal in advance. Customers can then trust the signals they receive and act on their realization. This thesis contains the work of three papers, each of which applies information design to service systems and online markets. We begin by examining how a firm could signal a queue's length to arriving, impatient customers in a service system. We show that the choice of an optimal signaling mechanism can be written as a infinite linear program and then show an intuitive form for its optimal solution. We show that with the optimal fixed price and optimal signaling, a firm can generate the same revenue as it could with an observable queue and length-dependent variable prices. Next, we study demand and inventory signaling in online markets: customers make strategic purchasing decisions, knowing the price will decrease if an item does not sell out. The firm aims to convince customers to buy now at a higher price. We show that the optimal signaling mechanism is public, and sends all customers the same information. Finally, we consider customers whose ex ante utility is not simply their expected ex post utility, but instead a function of its distribution. We bound the number of signals needed for the firm to generate their optimal utility and provide a convex program reduction of the firm's problem.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph.D., Operations Research and Information Engineering
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Operations Research and Information Engineering
Grantor
Cornell University
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lingenbrink, David Alan
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Iyer, Krishnamurthy
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Kleinberg, Robert David
  • Banerjee, Siddhartha

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
11050387
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 11470
ProQuest Publication ID: 13884129

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lingenbrink, David Alan. Information design in service systems and online markets. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Cornell University, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/67405