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Cornell University

Approximately-Optimal Mechanisms in Auction Design, Search Theory, and Matching Markets

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Algorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of algorithms that are used by strategic agents. This field has applications in many real-world settings, such as auction design, search problems, and matching markets. In this thesis we study the mechanisms in these areas through lenses of simplicity and practicality. We pursue two main directions: study the strength of simple mechanisms, and improve the efficiency of practical mechanisms. In auction design, we consider a setting where a seller wants to sell many items to many buyers, and establish a tight gap between the efficiency of a simple and commonly-used auction with the complicated revenue-optimal auction. In search theory context, we introduce Pandora's problem with alternative inspections and provide the first approximately-optimal mechanism for this problem. In Pandora's problem with alternative inspections, a searcher wants to select one out of n elements whose values are unknown ahead of time. The searcher evaluates the elements one by one and can choose among different costly ways to evaluate each element, the order to evaluate the elements, and how long to continue the search, in order to maximize her utility. In matching markets, we propose theoretical models that closely capture the participant behaviors in the real world, and provide methods to optimize the already implemented mechanisms.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Ph. D., Computer Science
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Beyhaghi, Hedyeh
Chair dc:contributor.chair
  • Tardos, Éva
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Kleinberg, Robert David
  • Halpern, Joseph Y.
  • Weinberg, Seth M.

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Bibid
13119714
Dc Identifier Other
ProQuest Submission ID: 11756
ProQuest Publication ID: 22624869

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cornell University
Base URL
ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Beyhaghi, Hedyeh. Approximately-Optimal Mechanisms in Auction Design, Search Theory, and Matching Markets. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1813/70013