Duquesne
Aristotle's Division of the Sciences and the Impossibility of a Science of Everything
Abstract
dc:description.abstractAristotle’s division between practical, productive, and theoretical sciences is widely acknowledged, and it is uncontroversial to say that it organizes his texts. However, contemporary scholarship often treats the division of the sciences as a mere organizational structure without investigating its underlying principles. My dissertation seeks to correct this oversight by investigating the logical principles of Aristotle’s division of the sciences in the Posterior Analytics’ account of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). My central argument is that Aristotle sees the sciences as inherently divided, so that a demonstrative science of everything is impossible. By understanding why science is divided, we are better equipped to approach virtually every area of Aristotle’s thought.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- One-year Embargo
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Lutz, Christopher
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Kelly Arenson
- Ronald Polansky
- Michael Harrington
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Aristotle
- Aristotelian Logic
- Posterior Analytics
- Ancient Science
- History of Science
- History of Philosophy
- Methodology
- Aristotle's Organon
- Demonstration
- Ancient Epistemology
- Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity
- Ancient Philosophy
- Epistemology
- History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
- Metaphysics
- Philosophy of Science
Rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/2344