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Duquesne

Aristotle's Division of the Sciences and the Impossibility of a Science of Everything

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Aristotle’s division between practical, productive, and theoretical sciences is widely acknowledged, and it is uncontroversial to say that it organizes his texts. However, contemporary scholarship often treats the division of the sciences as a mere organizational structure without investigating its underlying principles. My dissertation seeks to correct this oversight by investigating the logical principles of Aristotle’s division of the sciences in the Posterior Analytics’ account of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). My central argument is that Aristotle sees the sciences as inherently divided, so that a demonstrative science of everything is impossible. By understanding why science is divided, we are better equipped to approach virtually every area of Aristotle’s thought.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
PhD
Level thesis:degree_level
One-year Embargo
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lutz, Christopher
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Kelly Arenson
  • Ronald Polansky
  • Michael Harrington

Subjects

dc:subject × 16

Rights

Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/2344

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Duquesne
Base URL
dsc.duq.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lutz, Christopher. Aristotle's Division of the Sciences and the Impossibility of a Science of Everything. One-year Embargo thesis, https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/2344