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Georgia Institute of Technology

Monitoring Versus Incentives

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. When the principal can share monitoring results at an interim stage with the agent, the agent is able to modify his effort levels in certain situations for the benefit of both parties.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Management
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2006

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gilson, Paul W. R.
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Jayaraman, Narayanan
  • Nachman, David
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Chakrabarti, Rajesh
  • Church, Bryan
  • Eun, Cheol

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11556

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Gilson, Paul W. R.. Monitoring Versus Incentives. Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11556