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Georgia Institute of Technology

Financing and Debt Maturity Choices by Undiversified Owner-Managers: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

We examine the financing choices of undiversified large shareholders or owner-managers in a continuous time structural model with rational expectations. The interplay between the objective of the undiversified, self-interested owner-manager who controls the firm and the valuation of the firms marketed claims by well-diversified outside investors, has a major impact on leverage and debt maturity choices as well as credit spreads. The effect of this interplay is particularly significant in a world where the representative investor (who determines asset prices in the economy) is risk-averse leading to nonzero market prices of systematic risk and risk premia of the firms investment opportunities. In a perfect information framework with no taxes or bankruptcy costs, we show that, the owner-manager could, depending on the projects characteristics, finance them exclusively with debt, exclusively with equity, or with a combination of equity and debt. Ceteris paribus, leverage increases with the expected growth rate of firm value under its investment opportunities, and decreases with its volatility. Debt maturity varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with the expected growth rate, and decreases with the volatility. Our results reconcile empirical evidence on the variation of financing choices with firm characteristics that is not completely consistent with previous theories. The significant impact of the expected returns (therefore, risk premia) of firms investment opportunities on their leverage ratios, debt maturities, and credit spreads are important implications of our theory that cannot be obtained in these models or in models in which all agents are risk-neutral so that risk premia are zero. We empirically test the implications of our theory for the relationships among firms financing and debt maturity choices and the expected growth rate and volatility of their asset values. Controlling for all the significant determinants of firms financing and debt maturity choices identified by earlier studies, we show significant empirical support for our predictions.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Management
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2006

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Fu, Jinyi
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Subramanian, Ajay
  • Jayaraman, Narayanan
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Clarke, Jonathan
  • Chakrabarti, Rajesh
  • Phillips, Richard

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11587

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Fu, Jinyi. Financing and Debt Maturity Choices by Undiversified Owner-Managers: Theory and Evidence. Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11587