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Georgia Institute of Technology

Robust and secure monitoring and attribution of malicious behaviors

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Worldwide computer systems continue to execute malicious software that degrades the systemsâ performance and consumes network capacity by generating high volumes of unwanted traffic. Network-based detectors can effectively identify machines participating in the ongoing attacks by monitoring the traffic to and from the systems. But, network detection alone is not enough; it does not improve the operation of the Internet or the health of other machines connected to the network. We must identify malicious code running on infected systems, participating in global attack networks. This dissertation describes a robust and secure approach that identifies malware present on infected systems based on its undesirable use of network. Our approach, using virtualization, attributes malicious traffic to host-level processes responsible for the traffic. The attribution identifies on-host processes, but malware instances often exhibit parasitic behaviors to subvert the execution of benign processes. We then augment the attribution software with a host-level monitor that detects parasitic behaviors occurring at the user- and kernel-level. User-level parasitic attack detection happens via the system-call interface because it is a non-bypassable interface for user-level processes. Due to the unavailability of one such interface inside the kernel for drivers, we create a new driver monitoring interface inside the kernel to detect parasitic attacks occurring through this interface. Our attribution software relies on a guest kernelâ s data to identify on-host processes. To allow secure attribution, we prevent illegal modifications of critical kernel data from kernel-level malware. Together, our contributions produce a unified research outcome --an improved malicious code identification system for user- and kernel-level malware.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2011

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Srivastava, Abhinav
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Giffin, Jonathon
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Ahamad, Mustaque
  • Blough, Douglas
  • Lee, Wenke
  • Traynor, Patrick

Subjects

dc:subject × 9

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/41161

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Srivastava, Abhinav. Robust and secure monitoring and attribution of malicious behaviors. Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/41161