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Georgia Institute of Technology

Vulnerabilities in SNMPv3

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Network monitoring is a necessity for both reducing downtime and ensuring rapid response in the case of software or hardware failure. Unfortunately, one of the most widely used protocols for monitoring networks, the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3), does not offer an acceptable level of confidentiality or integrity for these services. In this paper, we demonstrate two attacks against the most current and secure version of the protocol with authentication and encryption enabled. In particular, we demonstrate that under reasonable conditions, we can read encrypted requests and forge messages between the network monitor and the hosts it observes. Such attacks are made possible by an insecure discovery mechanism, which allows an adversary capable of compromising a single network host to set the keys used by the security functions. Our attacks show that SNMPv3 places too much trust on the underlying network, and that this misplaced trust introduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Computing
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lawrence, Nigel Rhea
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Traynor, Patrick
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Bruckman, Amy
  • Eisenberg, Mike
  • Ferguson, Ron
  • Guzdial, Mark

Subjects

dc:subject × 20

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/44881

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lawrence, Nigel Rhea. Vulnerabilities in SNMPv3. Georgia Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/44881