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Georgia Institute of Technology

Employee volunteering and management control in cooperative settings

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This study experimentally investigates whether employee volunteering programs can serve as an informal control mechanism that improves cooperation in team settings. I posit that employees who participated in volunteering programs are more likely to be conditional cooperators, who are willing to cooperate if others also cooperate, and use others’ volunteering behavior as a signal of their type. I also posit that the effectiveness of this signal in facilitating cooperation depends on the perceived credibility of the signal. In the experiment, participants make a volunteering choice and then are paired to play a contextualized prisoners’ dilemma game. As predicted, I find that, when volunteering appears non-strategic, the cooperation rate is higher when the paired participants both volunteered than otherwise. However, when volunteering could be strategic, the cooperation rate does not differ significantly, regardless of whether one or both of the paired participants volunteered. Implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Department dc:contributor.department
Business
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Yang, Di
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Hales, Jeffrey
  • Majerczyk, Michael
  • Rupar, Kathy
  • Venkataraman, Shankar

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/60281

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Yang, Di. Employee volunteering and management control in cooperative settings. Doctoral thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/60281