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Georgia Institute of Technology

Trust versus Rewards: Revisiting Managerial Discretion in Incomplete Contracts

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Incentive compensation is often characterized by incomplete contracts. While managerial opportunism has been documented as one of the most pronounced problems with managerial discretion in incomplete contracts, prior work has not investigated the underlying mechanisms driving a loss of productivity. In this study, I experimentally investigate whether replacing human managers’ decision making with algorithm-generated bonus schemes that mimic managers’ decision making improves employee productivity. I find that compensation determined by algorithms generate higher productivity without sacrificing the residual profits. Further, the productivity-inducing effect of algorithms is stronger when the rewards are not contingent on the performance signal. These results are consistent with the idea that it is hard for managers to establish credibility for rewarding employees for their performance in incomplete contracts. Employee productivity can be improved by enhancing their trust in the rewarding mechanism, even when they are not paid a more generous bonus scheme. This study advances our understanding of the behavioral factors influencing employee productivity in incomplete contracts and the potential ways algorithm-based evaluations can be used to improve firm outcomes.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Department dc:contributor.department
Business
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hu, Wenqian
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Kuang, Xi (Jason)
  • Hales, Jeffrey
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Mackenzie, Nikki
  • Rupar-Wang, Kathy
  • Tafkov, Ivo

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/66642

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Hu, Wenqian. Trust versus Rewards: Revisiting Managerial Discretion in Incomplete Contracts. Doctoral thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/66642