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Georgia Institute of Technology

Efficient Learning for Hardware Security Validation Using Electromagnetic Side Channels

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The objective of this thesis is to combine the non-destructive monitoring advantages of standard and backscattering electromagnetic side channels with modern machine learning techniques to efficiently validate the authenticity of individual integrated circuits installed on a motherboard. The authenticity of integrated circuits is of increasing concern as more steps in the device manufacturing supply chain are outsourced, especially in light of severe global semiconductor shortages. Common methods for integrated circuit validation rely on either destructive techniques before high resolution imaging of the circuit interconnects or functional testing of a variety of test inputs with automated test equipment. These methods are time-consuming or even intractable to detect counterfeit components or stealthy modifications of their underlying circuitry. Side channels are any means of remotely leaking information related to a circuit's activity or architecture. Our work takes advantage of the electromagnetic (EM) side channel to remotely capture identifying information emitted from or backscattered off integrated circuits in the form of EM signals that can be used to validate their authenticity. This research attempts to alleviate the need for time-consuming and expensive destructive validation methods for hardware security by robustly detecting inauthentic or modified integrated circuits with remote EM side-channel measurements. The first aim of this research is to apply deep learning methods to classify and detect counterfeits of major ICs on a variety of motherboards. The second aim is to leverage hyperspectral scanning with the backscattered EM side-channel and a novel active learning method to detect dormant hardware trojans several times smaller than before. The last aim is to develop a compressed sensing approach to heavily reduce sampling for hardware trojan detection as well as to develop a hyperspectral characterization of expected and anomalous circuits.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jorgensen, Erik J.
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Zajić, Alenka
  • Bloch, Matthieu R.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Anderson, David
  • Davenport, Mark
  • Prvulovic, Milos
  • Lipasti, Mikko

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/67339

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Jorgensen, Erik J.. Efficient Learning for Hardware Security Validation Using Electromagnetic Side Channels. Doctoral thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/67339