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Georgia Institute of Technology

Compromising Industrial Processes using Web-Based Programmable Logic Controller Malware

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

We present a novel approach to developing programmable logic controller (PLC) malware that proves to be more flexible, resilient, and impactful than current strategies. While previous attacks on PLCs infect either the control logic or firmware portions of PLC computation, our proposed malware exclusively infects the web application hosted by the emerging embedded web servers within the PLCs. This strategy allows the malware to stealthily attack the underlying real-world machinery using the legitimate web application program interfaces (APIs) exposed by the admin portal website. Such attacks include falsifying sensor readings, disabling safety alarms, and manipulating physical actuators. Furthermore, this approach has significant advantages over existing PLC malware techniques (control logic and firmware) such as platform independence, ease-of-deployment, and higher levels of persistence. Our research shows that the emergence of web technology in industrial control environments has introduced new security concerns that are not present in the IT domain. Depending on the industrial process being controlled by the PLC, our attack can potentially cause catastrophic incidents or even loss of life. We verified these claims by performing a Stuxnet-style attack using a prototype implementation of this malware, dubbed Iron Spider, on a widely-used PLC model by exploiting zero-day web vulnerabilities that we discovered during our research. Our investigation reveals that every major PLC vendor (80% of global market share) produces a PLC that is vulnerable to our proposed attack vector. Lastly, we discuss potential countermeasures and mitigations.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Masters
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Georgia Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pickren, Ryan
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Beyah, Raheem A.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Zonouz, Saman
  • Li, Frank

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1853/75058

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Georgia Tech
Base URL
repository.gatech.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Pickren, Ryan. Compromising Industrial Processes using Web-Based Programmable Logic Controller Malware. Masters thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1853/75058