Georgia Institute of Technology
Xplicit: Static Information Flow Analysis for ARM32 Firmware
Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this work, we designed and implemented Xplicit; a static approach that aims to help identify potential vulnerabilities in firmware. The approach performs inter-procedural information flow analysis to track if untrusted data coming from different sources can reach sinks of interest after propagation. Our method takes into account two important elements, namely (1) implicit data flows and (2) the access of hardware control registers. We leveraged IDA Pro to disassemble firmware binaries. Then, we visualized the information flows and the corresponding instructions using NetworkX graphs. Finally, we scaled the analysis by parallelizing it with GNU Parallel and running IDA Pro in autonomous mode. Our approach is the first implementation to identify implicit data flows in ARM32 firmware binaries to the best of our knowledge. In addition, it minimizes the dependency on IDA Pro (after disassembly), so even less technical people or people with no IDA Pro knowledge will be enabled to look at the information flows and detect potential vulnerabilities. Our research can have a huge impact because it could identify potential vulnerabilities affecting devices running ARM32 firmware. Such devices can be found everywhere, from home Internet of Things (IoT) devices used by individuals to field devices used by an Industrial Control System (ICS).
Degree
thesis:*- Level thesis:degree_level
- Masters
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Electrical and Computer Engineering
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Georgia Institute of Technology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Karakatsanis, Konstantinos
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Keromytis, Angelos D.
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Monrose, Newman Fabian
- Ahamad, Mustaque
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en_US
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/1853/75716