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University of Glasgow

Riding two horses: Command and control in crisis management scenarios

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Literature about command and control, i.e. the direction and coordination of military forces, traditionally deals with technology and procedures. The underlying domestic conditions, including cultural, personal and political relations, are rarely the focus for command and control theory. This thesis' main assumption is that the conceptualising of command and control has to take such underlying conditions into account. At times, especially in crisis, some fundamental preconceptions are in conflict with each other, causing dangerous friction. The thesis analyses two instances, where several tacit, but still fundamental, assumptions were at loggerheads. The study is based on theoretical 'nuts and bolts', provided in the opening chapter. The first case, the appointment of General Foch as 'strategic director' of the allied forces in 1918, involves coalition warfare and looks at the conditions that hampered the realisation of a much extolled principle in command and control, 'unity of command'. In March 1918, the 'luxury' of having several armies present in the field, without any central military authority, became too expensive, as the Germans threatened to destroy the allied forces piecemeal. The thesis shows how internal British disagreements over strategy initially weakened the British Expeditionary Force, and then how Field-Marshal Haig made matters worse by relentlessly fighting for his prerogatives as their supreme commander. The thesis also shows how Haig after the was, forged his own account of the incident, to disguise the intolerable 'surrender' to a French general, and how this sham has coloured historians' accounts of the episode, until today. The second case analyses how Norway tumbled uito war in 1940. The Norwegian government had a tacit, incoherent and ill-coordinated plan for how they should once again keep Norway out of war. Parts of the plan were secret, even to the generals, as it probably had to be given Norway's status as neutral. The problems of secrecy were enhanced by the fact that some of the precautionary measures run counter to common military sense. As a consequence, the de facto decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a rather insignificant colonel. The case demonstrates how the underlying conditions of command and control, and not the actual directives from the government, which have traditionally been the historians' focus, determined Norway's destiny.

Degree

thesis:*
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
MPhil(R)
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Glasgow
Year dc:date.issued
2001

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hoiback, Harald

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

Language dc:language
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Glasgow
Base URL
theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Hoiback, Harald. Riding two horses: Command and control in crisis management scenarios. MPhil(R) thesis, University of Glasgow, 2001. https://doi.org/10.5525/gla.thesis.73412