University of Glasgow
Attentional differences in autism – the Priority Monotropism account
Abstract
dc:description.abstractI will introduce the heterogeneity problem and explain that it poses a serious threat to essentialist theories of autism. I will explain that the heterogeneity problem of autism has two prongs. The first prong of the heterogeneity problem is that autism is associated with a wide range of seemingly disparate symptoms and behaviours that do not share a clear conceptual link. The second prong of the heterogeneity problem is that there is individual variance between the symptom profiles of autistic individuals. I will introduce the following essentialist theories of autism: Weak Central Coherence theory, Theory of Mind theory, Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, and Executive Dysfunction theory. I will demonstrate that these theories are unable to overcome the heterogeneity problem. I will then introduce a further essentialist theory of autism—Monotropism. I will show that while Monotropism has the potential to overcome the heterogeneity problem, it is insufficient in its current form. I will claim that this is largely due to the lack of a clear definition of key terms, such as ‘attention’ and ‘interest’. This is especially problematic since this theory proposes that the core essence of autism is a difference in attentional style preference. I will introduce the heterogeneity problem and explain that it poses a serious threat to essentialist theories of autism. I will explain that the heterogeneity problem of autism has two prongs. The first prong of the heterogeneity problem is that autism is associated with a wide range of seemingly disparate symptoms and behaviours that do not share a clear conceptual link. The second prong of the heterogeneity problem is that there is individual variance between the symptom profiles of autistic individuals. I will introduce the following essentialist theories of autism: Weak Central Coherence theory, Theory of Mind theory, Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, and Executive Dysfunction theory. I will demonstrate that these theories are unable to overcome the heterogeneity problem. I will then introduce a further essentialist theory of autism—Monotropism. I will show that while Monotropism has the potential to overcome the heterogeneity problem, it is insufficient in its current form. I will claim that this is largely due to the lack of a clear definition of key terms, such as ‘attention’ and ‘interest’. This is especially problematic since this theory proposes that the core essence of autism is a difference in attentional style preference. In order to resolve this issue, I will create a revised account of Monotropism that makes clearer claims about these terms. In order to do this, I will examine three philosophical theories of attention and assess their suitability for providing a foundation for a revised account of Monotropism. These three theories are: the Selection for Action theory, the Cognitive Unison theory, and the Priority Structure account. I will ultimately conclude that the Priority Structure account provides the best foundation, and I will develop a revised account of Monotropism—Priority Monotropism—by using this theory as a foundation. I will then demonstrate that Priority Monotropism can overcome both prongs of the heterogeneity problem. Additionally, I will also demonstrate that considering autism through the lens of Priority Monotropism can allow for potential explanations about other previously unexplained aspects of autism, such as why it commonly co-occurs with a wide range of seemingly unrelated conditions.
Degree
thesis:*- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- PhD
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Glasgow
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Annan, Heather May
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- DOI dc:identifier.doi
- https://doi.org/10.5525/gla.thesis.86260