University of Crete (UOC)
Στρατηγική διοικητική αντιπροσώπευση και εταιρική κοινωνική ευθύνη σε ολιγοπωλιακές αγορές
Abstract
dc:descriptionOrthodox economic theory considers firms as economic agents, whose main purpose is to maximize profits. In the aforementioned context, any deviation from objectives that correspond to strict profit maximization indicates an agency problem within the firm. However, recent stylized facts reveal that contemporary firms' strategies often depart from strict profit maximization, seeking for competitive advantage in the market they operate. Such strategies may include strategic managerial delegation and corporate social responsibility. The purpose of the present Doctoral Thesis is to probe the effects of the above strategies, to firms' market performance and total welfare, in a game theoretic, experimental and industrial organization context, in order to demonstrate the strategic interactions that arise between firms in oligopolistic markets. The present Doctoral consists of four distinct chapters. The first chapter corresponds to the examination of the type of decisions that oligopolistic firms' owners will strategically delegate to their managers, in equilibrium. In the second chapter, the endogenous emergence of incentive contracts used by firms' owners to delegate the strategic decisions of their firm is studied. More specifically, an oligopoly delegation model in which firms' owners choose between incentive contracts which reward managers according to combinations of profit and revenue or profit and relative performance is presented and experimentally tested. Chapter 3 investigates firms’ owners' incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market. The question addressed is the following: "Why would the owner(s) of a private firm be willing to undertake costs in order to engage in activities that promote social values?". The last chapter examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement the provision of CSR activities by private firms in an oligopolistic market.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Crete (UOC)
- Year dc:date
- 2008
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Mitrokostas, Evangelos
- Μητροκώστας, Ευάγγελος
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Στρατηγική διοικητική αντιπροσώπευση
- Εταιρική κοινωνική ευθύνη
- Ολιγοπωλιακές αγορές
- Πειραματική οικονομική
- Θεωρία παιγνίων
- Βιομηχανική οργάνωση
- Strategic managerial delegation
- Corporate social responsibility
- Oligopolistic markets
- Experimental economics
- Game theory
- Industrial organization
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Social Sciences
- Economics and Business
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/15731