Abstract
dc:descriptionWe study the Agent Computational Economics’ problem of simulating agents’ behavior in a Cournot oligopoly model, by the use of co-evolutionary learning Genetic Algorithms. We try to discover algorithms of that kind, which conclude to the Nash Equilibrium outcome, and hence, can be used as heuristics for discovering the Nash Equilibrium quantities, as well. In order to quantify the difference between a given state of the co-evolutionary genetic algorithms and the goal outcome, we introduce a measure that is defined on the lumped states of the corresponding Markov Chain. We finally introduce an optimization algorithm that is based on the convergence of sequential best replies, and uses a genetic algorithm to identify the best reply at any given situation, which convergences to the Nash Equilibrium, under the aforementioned requirement.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Technical University of Crete (TUC)
- Year dc:date
- 2008
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Protopapas, Matthaios
- Πρωτόπαπας, Ματθαίος
Subjects
dc:subject × 18- Αλγόριθμοι, Γενετικοί
- Παίγνιο Κουρνό
- Αλυσίδες Μαρκώφ
- Αλγόριθμοι μάθησης
- Nash ισορροπία
- Αλγόριθμοι, Επαναληπτικοί
- Βέλτιστες απαντήσεις
- Algorithms, Genetic
- Cournot game
- Markov chains
- Learning algorithms
- Nash equilibrium
- Repetitive algorithms
- Best responses
- Επιστήμες Μηχανικού και Τεχνολογία
- Επιστήμη Ηλεκτρολόγου Μηχανικού, Ηλεκτρονικού Μηχανικού, Μηχανικού Η/Υ
- Engineering and Technology
- Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/17047