Abstract
dc:descriptionThe first Chapter, focuses on a particular (and very popular) form of indirect tax harmonization, when the (good) market is imperfectly competitive (and homogenous). It discusses the implication of tax harmonization for welfare when the governments raise revenues to provide global public goods. It shows that, under certain indirect tax harmonization will generate potential Pareto improvements. And, interestingly, this is true independently of the tax principle in place (destination or origin). Chapter two analyzes a simple model of imperfect commodity tax competition in a federal system where fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally across the `states' but also vertically between levels of government. Commodity taxation can take place either under the destination or origin principle and taxes can be either specific or ad valorem. Within such framework the interplay between the vertical tax externalities, that arise due to the commonality of the tax base, and the horizontal tax externalities associated with inter-state trade is explored. It is shown that independently of the tax principle and the type of tax levied, state taxation is too low (high), from an equilibrium point of view, if and only if consumers place a high (low) valuation on the state public expenditure relative to the federal. Chapter three focuses on capital taxation in a federal system too, extending, in particular, the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) to ad valorem taxation. It shows that, although under ad valorem taxation the fiscal externalities can be of any sign, the welfare implications of lower-level government ad-valorem taxation critically depends (as in Chapter two) on the deviation of the marginal valuation of federal public expenditure from the marginal valuation of lower-level government public expenditure. Chapter four returns to tax harmonization but it does so within an environment in which there is product differentiation. The analysis focuses on the welfare implication of a specific tax harmonization rule under both the destination and origin regimes but under different settings of international duopoly (Cournot and Bertrand). Chapter five re-examines the Keen and Lighart (2005) proposition by allowing governments to provide, with the tax revenues collected, a public good. It is shown that, in contrast to the Keen and Lighart (2005) results, in the presence of public goods the desirability of tariff and tax reforms is ambiguous.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
- Year dc:date
- 2009
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Καρακώστα, Ουράνια
- Karakosta, Ourania
Subjects
dc:subject × 8Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/17243