Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Οικονομικά θέματα και τεχνολογίες παροχής υπηρεσιών φωνής με χρήση πρωτοκόλλων διαδικτύου
Abstract
dc:descriptionVoIP call routing involves all the necessary tasks that a VoIP provider must perform in order to setup incoming calls from subscribers. Technology and regulatory developments allow the existence of multiple alternative ways (signalling servers) for routing a call, each one with certain attributes (for example cost, availability and call quality). This dissertation applies techniques from Operational Research and Communication Systems Evaluation. We propose and analyze policies and strategies for VoIP providers that can achieve optimal call routing by considering the expected profit from each successful call. An interesting aspect of these routing policies is the consideration of the time a caller is willing to wait until hearing the ring tone of a pending call. This characteristic allows a provider to make several attempts in order to connect a specific call. The first routing policy proposed is called 'Sequential' and suggests forwarding a call to a single signalling server each time, but allowing redials in case a previously contacted signalling server was found blocked. We propose conditions, that under some assumptions, result in optimal call routing; that is the selection of the optimal signalling server each time. The second routing policy proposed is called 'Forking' and is more generic than Sequential in the sense that allows forwarding a call request to multiple signalling servers. This policy takes advantage of a very interesting aspect of serving a call, the fact that whatever the number of providers attempting to setup a call only one of them will be able to reserve all necessary resources along the signalling path. This characteristic separates our optimization problem from similar problems found in the related work, as well as makes these routing strategies more attractive for VoIP providers. We also study the impact of Forking policy to the set of VoIP providers and owners of signalling servers. We conclude that there are cases where VoIP providers have the incentive to follow a very aggressive strategy with respect to the number of signalling servers used for each call and in relation to the socially optimum forking level. This results to the appearance of a Tragedy of the Commons type of problem. We propose an incentive mechanism that prompts VoIP providers to limit their forking level to the socially optimum. The proposed mechanism is the introduction of a signalling charge for each call setup that is attempted by a signalling server.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
- Year dc:date
- 2009
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Kalogiros, Costantinos
- Καλόγηρος, Κωνσταντίνος
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Βέλτιστες στρατηγικές δρομολόγησης κλήσεων
- Κλήσεις μέσω διαδικτύου
- Μηχανισμοί κινήτρων
- Θεωρία παιγνίων
- Υιοθέτηση συστημάτων επικοινωνίας
- Πειραματική αξιολόγηση
- Optimal call routing strategies
- Voice over IP
- Incentive mechanisms
- Game theory
- Adoption of communication systems
- Simulations
- Φυσικές Επιστήμες
- Επιστήμη Ηλεκτρονικών Υπολογιστών και Πληροφορική
- Natural Sciences
- Computer and Information Sciences
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/17652