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Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)

Ανταγωνισμός και τιμολόγηση με περιορισμούς παραγωγικού δυναμικού

Abstract

dc:description

This PhD thesis examines the dynamic investment and pricing decisions of firms operating under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty. In the first chapter we study the choice between exporting and investing in a foreign market under persistent demand uncertainty. There are demand shocks that increase expected profit but slow down the learning process. We determine the optimal export and investment paths and show that learning may explain their s-shape. We also determine the time of the initial investment. The second Chapter examines the dynamic pricing decision of a firm facing random demand while selling a fixed stock of two differentiated products. The optimal price of each product depends on the available stock of both products and reflects the trade off between increasing the probability of a sale and increasing the instantaneous revenue. We find that with a positive stock of only one variety, the optimal price path is nondecreasing. The same holds for the optimal price paths in the two-varieties case, with respect to the own stock level and as long as the probability of no sale is positive. When this probability equals zero, the price of a given variety is decreasing in its own stock and increasing in the stock of the other variety. In chapters three and four we examine dynamic duopoly price competition under constrained capacity which is determined endogenously. Chapter 3 analyses the case of simultaneous price competition and the impact of mergers on the optimal pricing and investment decisions as well as on welfare. We show that the low-capacity firm does not always sells out its stock. Whenever firms expect to merge they might invest in excess capacity (which reduces welfare). However, a merger might also increase welfare since there are cases where sales are foregone when the two firms compete but are realized, if they merge. In chapter 4 we extend the model by introducing sequential price setting. We examine the role of price leadership and current demand uncertainty. We find that with unobservable current-period demand, the high-capacity firm optimally lets the low-capacity firm sell out its inventory first (provided it is lower than residual demand). With observable current-period demand this holds only when the high-capacity firm is the leader. With dynamic price competition, when the price leader chooses capacity first and the cost is characterised by constant returns to scale, he could deter the follower from entering the market.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Year dc:date
2006

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Κότσεβα, Ροσίτσα

Subjects

dc:subject × 24

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/17658

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Κότσεβα, Ροσίτσα. Ανταγωνισμός και τιμολόγηση με περιορισμούς παραγωγικού δυναμικού. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB), 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/17658