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University of Crete (UOC)

Defending against known and unknown attacks using a network of affined honeypots

Abstract

dc:description

Security is increasingly regarded as an essential function for maintaining a reliable, available, and trustworthy network infrastructure. Viruses, worms, trojans, spyware and other types of malicious programs are discouraging the effective use of the Internet and crippling the network infrastructure. The exponential increase of attack volume and the evolution of attacking methods urge the need for efficient and accurate defense mechanisms. While research and development has produced a multitude of security products, including firewalls, antivirus systems and intrusion detection systems, demand for better security is growing far beyond what current systems can offer. Besides traditional network attacks, like worms and DoS attacks, new attack methods have appeared over the last few years. As the attack surface of remote exploits has been reduced due to advances in defenses and operating systems, new propagation methods are invented. Attackers, in their effort to adapt to security response, proactively explore and mitigate new threats. The World Wide Web is an excellent platform for launching attacks due to the vast number of users and plethora of technologies and architectures available for exploitation. This thesis discusses a new class of attacks that misuses the World Wide Web to create botnet-like infrastructures, which we call puppetnets. Puppetnets rely on websites that coerce web browsers to (unknowingly) participate in malicious activities. Such activities include distributed denial-of-service, worm propagation and reconnaissance probing, and can be engineered to be carried out in stealth, without any observable impact on an otherwise innocent-looking website. In this thesis we experimentally assess the threat from puppetnets. We discuss the building blocks for engineering puppetnet attacks and attempt to quantify how puppetnets would perform. In an effort to defends against known and unknown attacks, this thesis presents the NoAH infrastructure, a Network Of Affined Honeypots geographically distributed around the world. Honeypots act like traps; their purpose is to lure attackers by monitoring unused portions of the IP address space or imitating the behavior of real users. Honeypots have been shown to be very useful for accurately detecting attacks, including zero-day threats, at a reasonable cost and without false positives, unlike intrusion and anomaly detection systems. The NoAH architecture is extensible enough to allow the detection of both known and unseen attacks. The NoAH infrastructure is not a centralized farm of honeypots. On the contrary, it is a distributed set of honeyfarms that collaborate. Deployed honeyfarms either forward traffic to a centralized set of honeypots, called the NoAH core, or provide attack statistics for analysis and correlation purposes. Services like automated signature generation for zero-day attacks and display of statistics also run inside the core. An approach to validate the signatures generated by the NoAH components is also proposed. Our approach, called Sigval, is able to test signatures against large volumes of benign traffic in the order of few seconds.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Crete (UOC)
Year dc:date
2009

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Αντωνάτος, Σπυρίδων
  • Antonatos, Spyridon

Subjects

dc:subject × 12

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/18045

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Αντωνάτος, Σπυρίδων; Antonatos, Spyridon. Defending against known and unknown attacks using a network of affined honeypots. University of Crete (UOC), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/18045