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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Η ορθολογικότητα των οικονομικών δρώντων και η εξέλιξή της

Abstract

dc:description

The thesis introduces two kinds of heterogeneity in rationality. The first one of these assumes the simultaneous existence of consequential and procedural preferences (purposefully separated), weighted against each other in all possible ways. The second category pertains to the preferences over strategies themselves, allowing them to vary across individuals. Individuals are thought οf as having dispositions towards their available strategies; these preferences over strategies may or may not be compatible with their preferences over outcomes. Ultimately, a player’s choice of strategy is contingent on their type of rationality, which, in this context, refers to the relative intensity of consequential over procedural preferences. Much of the complexity of the static model is removed when the framework is studied under an evolutionary setting; people do still hold preferences over ends and preferences over means, but their choice of strategies is not based on any rational expectations. It is assumed that what drives evolution is a well-defined notion of disappointment. The consequential and procedural components of action, as seen in the static case, are preserved: hence, disappointment occurs either when some player ends up with less payoffs than what they could - given the choice of their co-player, or when the realised outcome does not correspond to the one ranked on top of this player’s (subjective) preferences over strategies. When at least one of these things happens, then the player has a tendency to switch to another strategy the next time they will be called to play the same game. Obviously, disappointment is a function of the player’s rationality type. There is a multitude of mechanisms that may be used to model how experiencing of disappointment translates to a change of strategy. Simulation results show that, generally, implications of different evolutionary mechanisms do not converge. This suggests yet another source of heterogeneity that should perhaps be addressed in the analysis of games.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2007

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Patokos, Tassos
  • Πατώκος, Αναστάσιος

Subjects

dc:subject × 14

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/18375

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Patokos, Tassos; Πατώκος, Αναστάσιος. Η ορθολογικότητα των οικονομικών δρώντων και η εξέλιξή της. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/18375