Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Η γνωσιακή διαδικασία στην αριστοτελική φιλοσοφία: αίσθησις, αίσθημα, φαντασία, φάντασμα, μνήμη, μνημόνευμα, νούς , νόημα
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe aim of this dissertation is to present and analyze systematically the Aristotelian stages of cognitive procedure: sense (α?σθησις), imagination (φαντασία), memory (μνήμη), and mind or intellect (νο?ς). In this respect, I develop my analysis in Four Parts: In the First Part, I examine the Aristotelian and the contemporary ideas about the different kind of senses, their function and their connection to sense perception (α?σθάνεσθαι). Also I try to answer the question concerning the way and the medium of transmission of sense qualities from the peripheral organs e.g. the organs of sight etc. to the common sense (κοιν?ν α?σθησιν), which, according to Aristotle, is responsible for various functions and is dependent on a single bodily organ, the heart. Also, in this part I examine the puzzling role of the brain in the Aristotelian theory of sense perception and I argue that it is to a great extent unfair to claim that Aristotle disregarded the role of the brain in the human organism quite as much as it is often claimed. I try to present and to reconstruct the Aristotelian ideas regarding the brain’s form and function, I suggest that a careful re-reading of the Aristotelian description of the brain will help us understand that the brain didn’t play a subsidiary role related to the heart, and I come to the conclusion that for Aristotle the heart and the brain formed a unit or a consolidated organ that controlled the body. In the Second Part, I present Aristotle’s ideas on imagination (φαντασία) and it’s relation to phantasmata (φαντάσματα). Moreover, I describe the difference between sensations (α?σθήματα) and phantasmata (φαντάσματα), and I analyze how the Aristotelian kinds or grades of imagination influenced the Stoic’s and George J. Romanes’s view on imagination. In the Third Part, I present the Aristotelian theory related to memory (μνήμη) and recollection (?νάμνησις) and I stress that Aristotle’s attitude toward this phenomena is more like that of a psychologist in contemporary terms than that of a philosopher. In the Fourth Part, I focus on the Aristotelian notion of mind/intellect (νο?ς) and it’s relation to phantasmata (φαντάσματα) and noemata (νοήματα). Thereafter, I provide an analysis of De anima, Book III, chapter IV and V, and I try to show that the distinction in passive mind and active mind is related to the two grades of a single mind or in other words it is related to the duality of a single mind. Finally, in the Appendix I examine how Aristotle’s remarks on the role of phantasmata in imagination, in memory and in the thinking process influenced: (a) later thinkers (e.g. Rene Descartes etc.), (b) early experimental psychologists (e.g. Wilhelm Wundt etc.) and (c) cognitive scientists (e.g. Stephen Kosslyn etc.).
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2008
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Παπαχρήστου, Χριστίνα
Subjects
dc:subject × 28- Αριστοτέλης
- Αίσθηση
- Φαντασία
- Μνήμη
- Νούς
- Φάντασμα
- Μνημόνευμα
- Νόημα
- Aristotles
- Sense
- Imagination
- Memory
- Mind
- Sensations
- Memory Image
- Noema
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Ιστορία και Φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης
- Ψυχολογία και Γνωσιακή Επιστήμη
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Ψυχολογία, διεπιστημονική προσέγγιση
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- History and Philosophy of Science
- Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
- Social Sciences
- Psychology, interdisciplinary
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/19152