Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός του Ernan Mcmullin και οι αριστοτελικές του καταβολές
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe purpose of this thesis is to analyze the scientific realism of Ernan McMullin and explore its Aristotelian roots. In this respect I present here the views of McMullin on the purpose of natural sciences from the perspective of the historical progress made by scientific activity: from prediction and the Aristotelian demonstrative ideal to Theoretical science and explanation. Moreover, I undertake to examine the issue of retroduction, which forms the nucleus of McMullin’s philosophical thought. This has lead me to an in-depth exploration of the views of Aristotle; I have taken into account not only what he writes in his treatises on logic, but also his cognitive system, as manifested mainly in De Anima and in various of his other works. I argue that the threefold concept epagoge-nous-phantasia as elaborated by Aristotle contains the element of a creative, logical movement, the so-called ‘mental leap’ or ephodos, as he describes it, necessary for the mind’s inductive progress towards the grasp of the universal. Ι suggest, then, that precisely this idea of ‘mental leap’ has its counterpart in McMullin’s theory of retroduction, in which the philosopher states that the inference drawn from the observed fact back to the unknown cause presupposes the operation of the imagination. Moreover, I maintain that the retroductive strategy that McMullin adopts has its roots in the Aristotelian cognitive system. Despite the fact that Aristotle did not actually recommend any retroductive strategy, he did offer those conceptual schemata (syllogismos, epagoge, nous, phantasia-phantasma, apagoge, dia ti esti) which laid the foundations for the arguments McMullin has developed in favour of scientific realism. I thus attempt a reconstruction of McMullin’s retroductive strategy, in the belief that it is grounded in the following argument: if we accept that the method of ampliative retroduction is able to justify the theoretical assertions concerning the non-observable, and that the explanatory success of a theory is an element in this ampliative retroduction, then we have to accept that the explanatory success of theories can justify these theoretical assertions. According to McMullin we can, indeed, make this assertion, provided, however, that we shift the question from truth to reality, i.e. to the field of the ontology of the non-observable.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2010
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Pechlivanidis, Christos
- Πεχλιβανίδης, Χρήστος
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός
- Απαγωγή
- Επαγωγή - νους - φαντασία
- Παρατηρήσιμο / μη παρατηρήσιμο
- Εξηγητική δύναμη / αλήθεια
- Αποτίμηση θεωριών
- Υποκορισμός των θεωριών
- Επιστημικές αρετές
- Scientific realism
- Abduction / retroduction
- Epagoge-nous-phantasia
- Observable / non observable
- Explanatory power / truth
- Theory appraisal
- Underdetermination of theories
- Epistemic virtues
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/19215