Abstract
dc:descriptionThe thesis argues that the separation of force and law is more than difficult and analyses the forms of their relation within the legal order, without considering their ontological differentiation as a fact. So, the crucial relation is represented in specific contradictions, such as between law and sovereignty, content and application, external conformity to and internal acceptance of the legal rule, finally between authority and truth. On the other hand, the synthesis of the normative and the normal, of the deontological with the ontological element does take place in the regime, the institutions of the political society. In the first part of the thesis the writer heightens the unity of power and rules, especially in the constitution. Moreover, it is argued that the actions of the government, due to the intense subjective-political character of political representation, tends to overcome the legal form of representation of the people. The separation of the source from the users of constitutional powers is constantly becoming more relative and, more or less, the logical priority of the sovereignty of the represented/governed towards the governors is reversed. In the second part of the thesis, the writer considers with references to the familiar themes of coercion and sanction, the relations between the content of the legal rule and its field of application. An important acknowledgement is that the law is extensively dependent on the field of application, through the influence of the so called “normative force of the real”. That’s why it is declared that the legal subject (the individual, the citizen and, of course, the official of the state) is present due to higher biological, social and historical status in the legal order. A basic conclusion is that the absolute separation of law from force is impossible, since this separation can only be in effect as an epistemological dogma. Also, it is argued that only by sovereignty can the legal rule “really” and practically be distinguished from the forces of the fields of application. For these reasons the democratic regime is considered, from the normative point of view, as the ideal form of synthesis between law and force. So, the (legal) subject “overshadows” the rule and comes to the forefront of philosophy of law. It is rather the authority (of Creon) that the truth (of Antigone) that constitutes the legal rule, the legal order and regime the constitutional.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2007
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Τσαϊτουρίδης, Χρήστος
Subjects
dc:subject × 23- Υποκείμενο δικαίου
- Κανόνας δικαίου
- Κανονικότητα
- Πολίτευμα
- Διάκριση δυναμης από δίκαιο
- Κυριαρχία
- Πεδίο εφαρμογής κανόνα
- Λαός
- Σώμα
- Δίκαιο
- Legal subject
- Legal rule
- Normality
- Regimes
- Separation of law from force
- Sovereignty
- Rule's field of application
- People
- Body
- Law
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Νομική Επιστήμη
- Social Sciences
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/21167