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University of Crete (UOC)

Regulation of environmental externalities in the agricultural sector: an evolutionary approach

Abstract

dc:description

The effectiveness of Voluntary Approaches as a regulatory measure to control non-point-source environmental pollution problems, is assessed through an evolutionary framework based on the assumption of bounded rationality of economic agents and described by imitation dynamics modeled by replicator dynamics. The aim of the Thesis is to assess the impact of the undounded and bounded behavioral rule on the dynamic behavior of a regulated population regarding the adoption or not of an indicated environmental behavior, the design of regulatory policy instruments that safeguard the attainment of socially optimal collective targets, and the design of a regulatory and inspection mechanism through a system characterized by fast-slow selection dynamics. Based on the analysis the compliance incentives of the population with environmental requirements, are affected by the monitoring effort selection rule and the rationality behavioural rule. If monitoring effort is chosen arbitrarily then independently of the rationality degree, the population adopts a monomorphic behavior, involving full or zero compliance. If monitoring is chosen optimally constrained by the optimizing rule the same monomorphic behaviour emerges, while if it is chosen conditionally to the imitation rule, then partial compliance is very likely. The assessment of the impacts of the various payment regimes of the Common Agricultural Policy, as foreseen by the Agenda 2000 reform, provided no clear evidence that the transition from the regime of fully coupled payments on the production level, to the regimes of partially or fully decoupled payments, and ultimately to the regime of rural development, has enhanced the collective environmental performance of the population. The definition of optimum measures indicated that it may be socially desirable on environmental grounds to retain coupled payments and extend the compliance enforcement mechanism. Under different assumptions about the structure of the legislation probability, the fast system can converge either to a steady-state characterized either by partial, full or zero participation in the environmental program. Similarly, depending on the structure of the inspection probability the slow system can converge to a steady-state characterized either by partial, full or zero compliance. The more complex the structure of the probabilities is, the more likely it is that the evolutionary equilibrium involves both partial participation and compliance.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Crete (UOC)
Year dc:date
2007

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Πασσά, Κωνσταντίνα

Subjects

dc:subject × 16

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/24276

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Πασσά, Κωνσταντίνα. Regulation of environmental externalities in the agricultural sector: an evolutionary approach. University of Crete (UOC), 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/24276