National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Investigating, thinking and speaking in the Pyrrhonean philosophy
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis aims to bring to the surface the peculiar nature of Pyrrhonean philosophy which has continued to elude our understanding in spite of the range and quantity of attention it has received from scholars in ancient philosophy as well as the wider philosophical community. The whole study is developed as a close reading and subtle analysis of Sextus Empincus. The first chapter focuses on PH I and clarifies the Sceptical conception of philosophical investigation in general and of Pyrrhonean in contrast to Dogmatic investigations in particular. For Sextus Scepticism is a developed ability to philosophize with the appropriate persistence in the original common way of philosophizing that at some point turned through the modes of suspension of judgment into the Sceptics ephectic way of philosophizing. It becomes clear from reading Sextus that it is wrong to take the attack against Dogmatic philosophy as the general and only type of Pyrrhonean philosophical Investigation. Pyrrhonism for Sextus is an original and genuine philosophy and not just an activity parasitic to philosophy which feeds lives on the development of Dogmatism. The second chapter focuses on Sextus book Against the Grammarians. There Sextus presents and defends the common practice according to which we adapt our vocabulary and our speech to whomever we are addressing in each case and he proposes the adoption in each context ordinary or philosophical of the form of language that suits the particular context. He refers specifically to philosophical language as another usage (συνήθεια) which just as with ordinary language we may employ simply in order to communicate effectively in certain contexts without any further commitments as to its ontological correctness. Sextus defence of this practical rule gains legitimacy to the extent that he succeeds in undermining the philosophical grounds on which the grammarians authority stands. The third chapter focuses on Sextus answer to the ancient criticism according to which the Pyrrhonean cannot investigate indeed cannot think and speak at all about the Dogmatists positive theses. Sextus presents the Dogmatists with a version of Meno’s puzzle and commits them to admitting that their only way out is to accept νοείν απλώς as the starting point of their investigation into unclear matters. Νοείν απλώς amounts to a way of thinking and speaking that does not carry any commitments as to the existence or the reality of what someone is thinking and talking about. Thus, Sextus introduces a critical alteration to the context of Dogmatic philosophizing which permits the Sceptics to participate in the Dogmatists investigations and to follow the Dogmatists way of speaking and thinking without making any dogmatic commitments. The chapter comes to the conclusion that Sextus offers a new formal solution to a strong version of Meno’s puzzle which is at once Dogmatism and Scepticism free and is for that reason elegant and philosophically attractive. The fourth chapter maintains that Sextus distinguishes in propria persona the context of the Dogmatic philosophers discussions from that of things said in ordinary life. The Sceptics are not committed to the Dogmatists view that ordinary language and concepts represent a vague grasp of reality requiring technical philosophical clarification which was supposed to lead to a superior exact language and conceptions that reveal things in their real nature. This chapter focuses inter aha on Sextus discussion about place (τόπος) and on Burnyeat’s interpretation of the relevant texts which it is suggested involves some serious misunderstandings In general the Sceptics are not committed to the view that the answer to the philosophical concern about living a good life lies along the path of philosophical investigations pursued by the Dogmatists. Not only has this path been barren but unjustified assumptions underlie the very beginning of the Dogmatists endeavour as also the foundations of their supposed positive philosophical knowledge.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2010
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Τηγάνη, Άννα
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Σέξτος Εμπειρικός
- Πυρρώνειος σκεπτικισμός
- Ειδικός και καθόλου λόγος
- Αρχαία Γραμματική - Ελληνισμός
- Παράδοξο του Μένωνα
- Κατάχρησις
- Γλώσσα του βίου
- Γλώσσα της φιλοσοφίας
- Sextus Empiricus
- Pyrrhonian Scepticism
- The two sceptical discourses (λόγοι)
- Ancient Grammar - Hellenism
- Meno's paradox
- Catachresis
- Ordinary language
- Philosophical language
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/26600