Back to search

Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)

Essays in industrial organization: vertical relations and product differentiation

Abstract

dc:description

This thesis examines the role of product differentiation and vertical contracting for the formation of the equilibrium outcome and for competition. It consists of three different Chapters. The first Chapter analyzes a dynamic vertical contracting model with learning-by-doing production technologies. The downstream retailer is a large player that sets the contract terms and the upstream differentiated manufacturers gain proficiency through the repetition of their production. A trade-off emerges between lower prices and larger variety in the market. When product differentiation is low, the "lower prices" effect dominates the "larger variety" effect and the total profits of the chain, the consumer's surplus and the total welfare are higher under exclusive dealing. Nevertheless, the rate of learning is not equal to the social optimal. The second Chapter studies a linear city model with duopoly upstream and downstream and exclusive dealing arrangements. Consumers have a transportation cost when buying from a retailer, and retailers have a transportation cost when buying from a wholesaler. We characterize the equilibria in a five-stage game where location and pricing decisions by all 4 firms are endogenous. The usual demand and price competition effects are modified and an additional strategic effect emerges, since the retailers' marginal costs become endogenous. Firms tend to locate farther away from the market center relative to the vertically integration case. When the wholesalers choose locations before the retailers, each wholesaler locates closer to the market center relative to the retailer locations, and relative to when the wholesalers cannot move first. Each wholesaler does this to strengthen the strategic position of its retailer by credibly pulling him towards the market center. Variations of the model and welfare analysis are provided. In the last Chapter, we focus on different vertical trading structures under horizontal product differentiation. We examine a linear-city model with successive duopolies where firms are located within the unit interval and both consumers and retailers pay transportation costs. In our three stage game, we endogenize the wholesale and pricing decisions under two different vertical pricing types: under non discriminatory pricing the wholesalers charge the same linear wholesale price to both retailers and under price discrimination the wholesalers are allowed to charge different prices to the retailers. Under linear pricing, there is an equilibrium in pure strategies on the wholesale prices only when the upstream transportation cost is not too low relative to the downstream transportation cost. Further, price competition is more intense under price discrimination and leads to lower wholesale and final prices for low values of the retailers' cost parameter.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Year dc:date
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Kourandi, Frago
  • Κουραντή, Φραγκώ

Subjects

dc:subject × 20

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/28897

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Kourandi, Frago; Κουραντή, Φραγκώ. Essays in industrial organization: vertical relations and product differentiation. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/28897