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Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)

Η αλληλεγγύη ως θεμελιώδης αρχή δικαίου

Abstract

dc:description

Contrary to liberty and equality, solidarity has been laid in the shadow of the well-known triptych of the French Revolution. Whereas the first two have been conceived as principles of justice, solidarity is conceived either as a mere natural feeling either as a flexible moral statement. The present thesis initially starts with the thought that the duty of solidarity ought not to be dropped on the inconsistent, as well as irrelevant to justice, field of personal sentiments. Neither should it be abandoned on the field of individual virtue, voluntarily accomplished, for the reason that this discredits its very nature as a duty. Our aspect proposes a philosophical pattern of grounding and reasoning that stands critical to theories that deny or restrain the binding status of solidarity, as well as socio-historical circumstances that directly put it at risk. Our central argument is drawn by a, poorly noticed, Kant’s idea about self-reliance with regard to resources as a fundamental principle for the right constitution of a legal state. Positive law consists of the institutional conditions, under which one’s liberty can and should coexist with others liberty. The solidarity principle corresponds to a fundamental condition, according to which all persons acclaim their shared liberty, provided they display self-reliance that enables them to pose and seek legitimate goals, independently to the compulsive will of the others. Thus, people as citizens and legal persons, owe to contribute to each other regarding to the empowerment of equal self-reliance. Solidarity represents, at first level, a fundamental principle of social justice, even before its legal institutionalization, as a condition of possibility for a respectful state law. It represents, at second level, a derivative constitutional principle, that implies normatively the following: In its affirmative dimension, that everybody claims in respect to the organized political whole that he/she should be self-reliable. And, in its apophatic dimension, that everybody owes to contribute in the self-reliance of others. Therefore, it is structured a fundamental right/duty dipole, that operates, notably, in a two-sided way: citizens claim self-reliance, aligned to a solidarity duty they bear mutually, while as the organized state claims solidarity accomplishment, aligned to an obligation that it carries for the promotion of a profound and substantial social state. Our thesis defends that this normative dipole is positively affirmed in the art. 25 par. 4 of the Greek Constitution (citizens duty of solidarity), in its relevance to art. 25 par. 2 (state obligation to promote substantial justice and social progress). Under such an argument, one can interpret, on the one hand, social rights as partial claims of the integral self-reliance claim, while on the other hand one can undertake progressive fiscal duty, social security contribution and environmental protection as contributions, according to oneself’s capacity, to the equal self-reliance of all. Solidarity principle, on the scope of self-reliance, resolves the constant legal problem of the exact content of the social rights-duties and their normative and effective value.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Year dc:date
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Μήτας, Στέργιος

Subjects

dc:subject × 16

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/29161

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Μήτας, Στέργιος. Η αλληλεγγύη ως θεμελιώδης αρχή δικαίου. Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/29161