Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Διερεύνηση κοινωνικο-οικονομικών αλληλεπιδράσεων στην εφαρμογή της κοινοτικής διαχείρισης των υδατικών πόρων
Abstract
dc:descriptionIrrigation systems are common pool resources since they are characterized by both difficulty of exclusion and high subtractability. Traditional economic theory argues that the absence of property rights and the selfish nature of mankind can lead to the exhaustion of common pool resources, which Hardin in 1968 defined as the “tragedy of the commons”. However, a significant number of publications found in bibliography, challenges these ominous predictions. These studies demonstrate that people with common interest, perceive the degree of their interdependence and contract durable agreements that ensure both high performance and sustainable management of the resource. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework which is widely used for studying common pool resources played a leading role in the organization of this study. At first a case study research which was conducted in villages of Euritania is presented. The results of the research indicate that local communities managed to self-govern irrigation systems by creating long lasting institutions, which successfully avoided water resources overexploitation and internal conflicts.An economic experiment, which aimed at the modeling of the interaction between users of an underground aquifer and the possibility of collaboration among them, also took place. In the experiment a normalized equation defined the outcome for the user of a single well, as a function of his and the other users’ pumping rate as well as the hydrological conditions. A highly competitive attitude is assumed to guide the behavior of each user in the perspective of maximizing one’s profit. Nevertheless the results showed that introducing the components of communication and sanctions among the users lead to a cooperative attitude and to the achievement of lower pumping rates, close to the optimal social solution. Finally, agent-based models are presented. The models simulating the baseline interaction between the users of an underground aquifer responded successfully to a comparison with the economic experiment at a set of variables. The simulation of the users’ behaviour after a communication session, using elements of cognitive psychology, was also accomplished by a multi-population genetic algorithm. Using a single-population algorithm a number of agents were assumed to follow an altruistic behaviour i.e. with pumping rates equal to the optimal social solution. It is demonstrated that the influence of the altruist actions on the behavior of others as well as the total economic benefit is quite important.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2012
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Georgakopoulos, Georgios
- Γεωργακόπουλος, Γεώργιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Διαχείριση υδατικών πόρων
- Θεωρία παιγνίων
- Μοντέλα βασισμένα σε πράκτορες
- Οικονομικό πείραμα
- Εμπειρική ανάλυση
- Αρδευτικά δίκτυα
- Πόροι κοινής δεξαμενής
- Θεωρητικό πλαίσιο της θεσμικής ανάλυσης και ανάπτυξης
- Water resources management
- Game theory
- Agent-based models
- Economic experiment
- Case study
- Irrigation systems
- Common pool resources
- Institutional analysis and development framework
- Επιστήμες Μηχανικού και Τεχνολογία
- Επιστήμη Πολιτικού Μηχανικού
- Engineering and Technology
- Civil Engineering
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/29306