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Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)

Kant και Wittgenstein: από την κριτική της γνώσης στην κριτική του νοήματος

Abstract

dc:description

What the Thesis proposes is a comparison between Kant’s critical philosophy and Wittgenstein’s critical practice of his later works. The term ‘critical’ should be understood twofold: First as the self -critique of the critical Kant of his early pre-critical project and, likewise, Wittgenstein’s critique of his own early thought; second as the transformation of the above self-critique to the critique of pure Reason (Kant) and to a critique of language (Wittgenstein). Critical philosophy exposes metaphysical illusion as a side effect of the way we think and speak. Therefore, it will prove to be not a correction of metaphysical thesis’, replacing one thesis with another (transcendental or grammatical), but it will seek, instead, to uncover the root and possibility of every metaphysical claim. Metaphysics will be exposed as a natural disposition of our human nature. But in order for Kant and Wittgenstein to acknowledge and expose metaphysics as an unavoidable illusion they must, first, expose their own early metaphysical claims as illusory. Pre-critical Kant proposes a paradoxical metaphysics granting that there exists a reality, although we are unable to know it. The thing in itself grounds knowledge but, most important, symbolizes reality itself. A similar paradoxical metaphysics is to be found in early Wittgenstein’s thought. He proposes that we understand what we cannot put into words. Logic does not reveal a theory of meaning, but rather the meaning of life itself, that is that everything does make sense, although we are unable to put this into words. Kant’s Copernican revolution proposes just this: We ought to examine our way of representing the object instead of examining what an object is. We need, in other words, to re-orientate our investigation from Being to Representation. Thus transcendental and grammatical investigation investigates the forms of representation we use, the way we look at things. The consequences are rather practical than theoretical. Critical philosophy understands that the human being maintains a plurality of autonomous perspectives that cannot be brought under one and sole principal, being god, nature or the general nature of the proposition. Kant recognizes Reason’s interest as an answer to the question ‘what is a human being’; the diversity of our interests defines the way through which we look at nature. Thus to be human is to be perspectival. A similar consequence can be drawn from Wittgenstein’s late work. Grammar is perspectival consisting in a multitude of autonomous forms of representation. Wittgenstein thus understands our need to orientate ourselves in and through language in order to avoid metaphysical illusion and to understand our selves echoing Reason’s self-knowledge as a perquisite of any critique of metaphysics. Thus, we can rephrase, as Stegmaier (2007) proposes, the Kantian question ‘what does it mean to orientate oneself in thought?’ as: ‘What does it mean to orientate oneself in language?’

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Year dc:date
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Gadris, Stelios
  • Γκαδρής, Στέλιος

Subjects

dc:subject × 18

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/31771

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Gadris, Stelios; Γκαδρής, Στέλιος. Kant και Wittgenstein: από την κριτική της γνώσης στην κριτική του νοήματος. Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH), 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/31771