Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Specific issues in international trade and the environment
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn Chapter 1 of the thesis we extend the existing theory by allowing the firms to affect future environmental regulation. We construct a model of strategic environmental policy with endogenous regulationin an international duopoly context. Firms can affect future environmental regulation through a long-term investment in abatement technologies. We demonstrate that when governments use environmental policy strategically, welfare declines while pollution increases. We further illustrate that when emission standards are used as a policy instrument, instead of emission taxes, pollution, profits and welfare increase. Finally, we claim that flexibility in environmental policy is superior in terms of profits and welfare to a prior commitment to a certain emission standard. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive theory concerning the optimal policy instrument choice, both under the states of certainty and uncertainty. Therefore, we construct a similar model to the one presented in Chapter 1 with the difference that the governments commit to their policies and thus the investment stage disappears. We further assume that governments, contrary to their exporting firms, are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand, the cost of abatement and the damage caused from pollution. Under any of these modes of uncertainty, governments select a policy instrument, either an emissions standard or an emissions tax, in order to regulate pollution production. Contrary to the existing literature, we provide sufficient conditions under which the governments optimally choose an emissions tax instead of a standard. In the last chapter of the thesis, Chapter 3, we suggest an alternative policy scenario, where the governments allow the firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting countries do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. The strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level which is closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher compared to the corresponding one in the non-tradable permits case. When we allow for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential benefits for the exporting countries since the prisoners' dilemma is moderated.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
- Year dc:date
- 2009
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Antoniou, Fabio
- Αντωνίου, Φάμπιο
Subjects
dc:subject × 10Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/32159