National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Essays on financial regulation and financial development
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe present study aimed at addressing three issues concerning the relationship between financial regulation and financial development that could clarify the nature and significance of their interconnection. The first paper developed a mathematical model in order to show that financial regulation might be beneficial rather than detrimental to financial development. The crucial point here is the connection of the administratively set interest rates with safeguard provisions. The latter should both alleviate the negative effect of rates set by fiat on savings and contribute to the institutional transformation of the economy. This could be achieved by setting forth mechanisms that introduce a more transactions-costs economizing contracting scheme between firms and lenders. The substitution of free market mechanisms by government sponsored hierarchical modes depends on asset specificity, which in finance takes the form of increased verification costs of asset returns and depends on the real and institutional domestic economic conditions. Hence, the paper argues that financial repression/regulation is in fact a policy of adjustment of the economy to adverse economic situations, such as but not confined to, the magnitude of the Great Depression in the 30s’ or alternatively, a policy of economic and institutional development for both LDCs and developed economies. On the other hand, financial regulation cannot be confined only to emergency cases, as far as a continuous presence of the regulatory authority both as signal of future drastic intervention and as monitor of the system is needed. This version of regulation just confirms the fragility of even developed financial markets and the need for regulation and development to go hand in hand and reinforce each other. The common factor of both is the demands of the real economy and their reflection to the adequate institutional infrastructure of the economy. The second paper tried to alleviate “the veil ignorance” that surrounds the change from a regulated to a deregulated financial regime in 1980s under the rubric of financial liberalization. The focus is on the Greek case and the paper establishes that institutional development did not come as “a manna from heaven” by unilateral decisions of the state during the 1980s and 1990s. On the contrary, Development Banks acted in a persistent manner in favour of financial development as early as in the 1960s. Their role as capital market substitutes contributed to the training of the enterprises and the investment public to practices and techniques of modern capital markets. On the other hand, they prepared and proposed to the government measures that should be taken and new financial instruments that should be used in order to promote financial development in accordance with the pursued goal of economic development of the country. Hence, financial liberalization during the 1980s was not a surprise to them at least at the level of the institutional goals they posed. Another point that emerged from our analysis is that development banks cannot be assessed as traditional banking institutions. Their double role made them crucially dependent on government policy. To the degree that the state was supportive, development banks took bold initiatives – with more or less success depending on the competence of their management – towards financing industry and promoting new financial techniques. Their ultimate constraint was the existing financial environment and their interaction with it that lead to their gradual transformation during the 1990s. These observations lead to us to the result that Development Banks in Greece were in fact, both subjects – promoters and initiators – and objects of financial development as far as their transformation was a reflection of the transformation of the financial structure of the country. They were so interrelated with the existing financial environment that its liberalization meant their complete transformation and not just a change of levels from less to more competitive operation as it happened to the other commercial banks. This “privileged” connection between development banks and the financial structure made up their uniqueness as institutions and the inability to assess them and model them as any other banking firm. The same particularity of these Banks rendered government policy – mainly in the form of Monetary Committee directives – the ultimate risk factor of their operation and the main constraint that they faced during their forty-years functioning in the Greek Economy. Our final paper used both historical paradigms and mathematical techniques to build a model of regulatory change in search of an optimum degree of regulation given differing economic conditions. The model was based on “Minsky-Kindleberger” theory of financial cycles as encompassing the process of innovation, crises and regulation in the characterization of the workings of the financial system. Its advantage rests on relating developments in the financial sector with real economic conditions in an interactive way that might give an explanation both for the emergence and the need for regulation and for regulatory change. Another asset of this approach is the provision for government intervention to prevent financial crises although bad timing of intervention or excessive reliance on demand policies might have its costs on the efficiency of intervention. The model described on these grounds is based on a mathematical modeling of the interbank market. In this sense, it indicates a pattern of regulatory change depending on the “Minsky-Kindleberger cycles” of the economy as these are reflected in the financial conditions of firms and are expressed in bank’s expectations in the form of degree of confidence. Banks rest at the centre of this model as the major vehicles of credit extension in a market economy. Banks finance firms and hold expectations about their projects. Euphoria is reflected in banks expectations for firms’ prospects and innovation in the interbank market accommodates it. Then, a real event such as a major failure expressed as piling up of firms’ defaults on bank loans turns overconfidence into pessimism and the boom into a crisis. A third agent should then be introduced in the model if we are to explain regulation as an intervention that changes the structure of incentives for economic agents. The government or a monetary authority can intervene either in the boom to curtail euphoria before it is developed into a crisis or during the slump to prevent financial collapse. The optimum degree and form of regulation has to do with the specific answer that each phase of the cycle, with its particular characteristics, demands. The three papers whose results are described above were written just before and in the midst of one of the most worrisome financial and economic crises the World has passed through since the Great Depression of the 1930s. One of the most pressing issues that this turmoil has posed is the re-examination of the relationship between financial regulation and innovation and development in the financial sector especially during the deregulation era. We hope that the papers presented here have contributed to the pluralism that the relevant debate demands for the sake of financial stability and economic development.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2010
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Loizos, Konstantinos
- Λοΐζος, Κωνσταντίνος
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Χρηματοοικονομική ρύθμιση
- Χρηματοοικονομική ανάπτυξη
- Συναλλακτικά κόστη
- Αναπτυξιακή τραπεζική
- Χρηματοοικονομικοί κύκλοι
- Χρηματοοικονομική ευθραυστότητα
- Financial regulation
- Financial development
- TRANSACTION COSTS
- Development banking
- Financial cycles
- Financial fragility
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Social Sciences
- Economics and Business
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/33055